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ABSTRACT. In this article, David Lewin examines the processes of educational representation, 11 
simplification, and selection, proposing the term “pedagogical reduction” in order to clarify the 12 
role these processes play within pedagogy. Although this term is virtually unknown among 13 
Anglo-American educational theorists, it reflects a substantial theoretical basis in the related 14 
German concept didaktishe Reduktion. Drawing on sources from the hermeneutic tradition, 15 
Lewin argues that education is fundamentally an interpretive exercise since selection and 16 
simplification require the interpretive judgment of educators, and that the hermeneutic 17 
constraints applied to education entail forms of reduction. He then examines pedagogical 18 
reduction within the curriculum areas of history, science, and philosophy in order to illustrate the 19 
generative and generalizing nature of pedagogical reduction, which takes students from 20 
particulars (objects, exercises, or events) to general or universal principles. Lewin discusses 21 
Comenius’s 1658 textbook Orbis Sensualism Pictus in order both to illustrate pedagogical 22 
reduction as a historical form as well as to draw attention to a key historical moment in the 23 
development of educational representation and reduction. He then turns to an examination of 24 
skepticism of pedagogical reduction from progressive and critical pedagogies. The argument 25 
 2 
culminates in the suggestion that educational theory is too often presented with a false dilemma: 1 
either accept the need for a contrived educational experience disconnected from the 2 
experiences and concerns of life, or react against this flattened educational aspiration by 3 
seeking something authentic and progressive that meaninglessly conflates education and life. 4 
Understanding the proper place of reduction in education, Lewin concludes, is vital in mediating 5 
this dichotomy. 6 
 7 
Introduction 8 
We live in a complex world. One of the fundamental questions educators must consider 9 
is one of educational representation: how is the complexity of things to be made understandable 10 
to the next generation? This article will examine some ways in which educators present and 11 
represent the world to the young. The acts of presenting and representing in education could be 12 
boiled down to the efforts to draw the attention of students to particular things, efforts that 13 
involve various forms of selection and simplification aimed toward general understanding. This 14 
variety of activities undertaken to simplify complexity is here referred to as pedagogical 15 
reduction. Although the processes of pedagogical reduction — of selection, simplification, and 16 
generalization — are activities that most, if not all, educators would immediately recognize, 17 
there is relatively little theory of educational representation and reduction among Anglo-18 
American educational theorists.1 German language educational theory tends to theorize this 19 
conception more explicitly by exploring the related term: didaktishe Reduktion; again, though, 20 
this term (and its English equivalent: didactic reduction) has not been commonly translated into, 21 
or taken up by, the English-speaking world. If it is true that most educators would immediately 22 
recognize pedagogical reduction, why does it matter if a corresponding theory is absent? It is 23 
not the case that theoretical discourse concerning pedagogical representation is absent, 24 
however; rather, such theory tends to take the form of critique: progressive and critical 25 
pedagogues are disposed to focus analysis on normative questions of the failures of 26 
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representation, from critical analysis of whose interests govern pedagogical representations, to 1 
how we can avoid constructing an inauthentic educational reality disconnected from a putative 2 
real world. For instance, a hermeneutics of suspicion is applied to the interests that determine 3 
the structure and content of textbooks. Although a critical attitude is often appropriate, I argue 4 
that the impact of the absence of a more general descriptive theory of pedagogical reduction is 5 
that insufficient consideration is given to the appropriate nature and scope of pedagogical 6 
reduction. In other words, while critics are apt to point out that the content of curriculum is 7 
complex and contested, representing unacknowledged and prejudiced canonical interests, there 8 
is seldom an explicit recognition and justification of the need for pedagogical reduction per se. In 9 
what follows I argue not only that a theory of pedagogical reduction is valuable, but that we 10 
cannot understand or practice education without it. The central claim of this article can be 11 
reduced to this: that pedagogical reduction is unavoidable in thinking about, or practicing, 12 
education. 13 
The argument begins by making the case for using the term “pedagogical reduction,” 14 
first, by examining the concept of reduction more generally and, second, by showing how it can 15 
be helpfully applied to educational theories and practices. I illustrate the concept of reduction in 16 
education through a number of examples to illustrate the key principles of selection, 17 
simplification, and generalization. I then go on to show how the construction of pedagogical 18 
reductions is given archetypical form in the textbook. I discuss the first textbook for children 19 
published in 1658, Comenius’s Orbis Sensualium Pictus. The publication of this text is 20 
significant because it has been associated with the shift from presenting the world to children to 21 
a more self-conscious and explicitly pedagogical re-presentation of the world,2 thereby providing 22 
an illustration of the origins of systematic pedagogical reduction. The argument then goes on to 23 
address how modern forms of critical and progressive education tend to obscure this significant 24 
educational process.  25 
Pedagogical Reduction 26 
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The term reduction is used both as a verb (to reduce something by making it smaller or 1 
simpler) and as a noun (the object that has been reduced). It contains the verb stem educe 2 
which literally means to “draw out, extract; branch out.”3 This etymology ties reduction to 3 
education in a very direct way. The Latin etymology refers to the idea of “bringing back, or 4 
restoring,” employing ducere, meaning “bring, or lead out.” Thus, to reduce, to educe, and to 5 
educate, each connote drawing or bringing something out. By drawing attention, education is a 6 
generative reduction of the world that draws out through constraint: an enabling constraint. This 7 
emphasizes the verbal process, but I also want to keep in mind that reduction is a helpful term 8 
for the objects that result from the process. Textbooks are probably the paradigmatic form of the 9 
pedagogical reduction, but before I examine this form, let me briefly illustrate the concept in a 10 
variety of contexts: museums and galleries use light and space in particular ways to draw 11 
attention to certain things with pedagogical intention; children’s toys often present elements of 12 
the world in miniature, again based at least partially on pedagogical or developmental interests; 13 
children’s moral tales are often designed to simplify complex dilemmas or sanitize darker 14 
instincts with formative influences in mind; children learn to ride with “balance bikes,” bikes that 15 
have the complexity of gears, pedals, and brakes removed for pedagogical purposes. Let me 16 
develop further the example of the balance bike.  17 
Although something like the balance bike has existed nearly as long as cycling itself, the 18 
modern form has become pedagogically popular as a stage of learning in recent years. It seems 19 
that the popularity of these bikes can be explained by a shift in how the process of learning to 20 
ride a bike is understood. Learning to ride is often understood to build upon the fundamental 21 
skills of balance and steering. Once they are developed, then other skills — pedaling, braking, 22 
and gears — can become the focus. Prior to the development of the balance bike, stabilizers 23 
(also known as training wheels) were (and still are) commonly used, though increasingly it is 24 
recognized that to remove the element of balance from the early stages of learning to ride is 25 
counterproductive.4 Although stabilizers enact a pedagogical reduction, their use is arguably not 26 
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as effective as balance bikes for the intended purpose (learning to ride a bike). In any case, 1 
these bikes are used to simplify by breaking down a complex activity into constituent parts that 2 
are presented in a staged manner.  3 
It is more common to see pedagogical representations and reductions in more “bookish” 4 
forms of knowledge. Consider Daniel Tröhler’s distinction between “research knowledge” and 5 
“pedagogical knowledge.” Tröhler argues that research knowledge is generated by questioning 6 
existing knowledge using verifiable scientific methods, resulting in new, but still provisional 7 
knowledge. This kind of knowledge is contrasted with pedagogical knowledge whose chief 8 
characteristic is to be “combined, arranged and structured for the purpose of effective 9 
teaching.”5 The presentation of pedagogical knowledge, often in textbook form, follows certain 10 
principles: the knowledge is stable, not provisional or contested; exceptions and contradictions 11 
are avoided; elements are presented in discrete parts or units; the presentation itself is often 12 
attractive or entertaining in some way. The forms of pedagogical knowledge can be summarized 13 
as the “[s]election, condensation, composition, didactical structuring and streamlining for 14 
classroom instruction.”6 This distinction between research and pedagogical knowledge can be 15 
overstated: one must keep in mind that as soon as one attempts to communicate research 16 
knowledge, one is thinking about how it is to be best presented and so questions of pedagogical 17 
representation are never too far away. Conversely, pedagogical knowledge is not disconnected 18 
from research knowledge as though it is only concerned with the mechanics of effective 19 
communication: even pedagogical knowledge is about something in the world. Nevertheless, 20 
the distinction is useful and visible in all sorts of contexts. Tröhler’s definition of pedagogical 21 
knowledge emphasizes the intentional nature on the part of educators to restrict the 22 
presentation of some subject matter.7 Educators do not simply show what they know, or allow 23 
the whole world to come into appearance, rather they intentionally select what they think is 24 
worthwhile or important. Shaun Gallagher calls this the “noncoincidence between her 25 
[educator’s] understanding and her presentation.”8 At first sight, it seems reasonable to suppose 26 
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that an educational re-presentation is likely to be a reduced subset of the educator’s fuller 1 
understanding. Math educators, for example, must consider which aspects of their 2 
understanding to present, though even here the ability to effectively re-present subject matter 3 
requires considerable mathematical capacity, complicating the image of education as the 4 
presentation of a subset of understanding.9  5 
Tröhler describes the Heidelberg Catechism as “a prime example of an educational work 6 
or ‘textbook’ that treats knowledge pedagogically”10 since it elides the theological controversies 7 
of the Reformation, re-presenting the gospel in accessible and uncontested form. We are more 8 
likely to be familiar with the ways secular textbooks embody pedagogical reduction, rendering 9 
fields of knowledge into particular curricula. Educators make judgements about the kinds of 10 
interpretation of the world that most effectively support the students, and the sequence in which 11 
those interpretations are best presented, by providing select narratives and examples.11 The 12 
concept of the curriculum exemplar illustrates well how a particular example is used to refer 13 
students to a general principle or idea. In presenting the concept of exemplarity, I have in mind 14 
what Martin Wagenschein has called “teaching to understand.”12 Here Wagenschein warns 15 
against two tendencies that would challenge the pedagogical reduction: (1) the propensity to 16 
view learning as a linear movement from simple to complex, and (2) the temptation for 17 
completeness. In discussing the first tendency, Wagenschein argues that there are pedagogical 18 
reasons to encourage students to encounter a small amount of relative complexity in detail early 19 
on so that certain principles of understanding are formed — what is sometimes colloquially 20 
called a deep dive. At first glance, this approach does not seem consistent with the notion of a 21 
reduction of complexity, but in fact not only does it highlight selection and re-presentation, it also 22 
describes how a field is reduced to some exemplary episode in order to help the student 23 
understand it more broadly. Regarding the second tendency, no curriculum can be described as 24 
complete, but educators who do not theorize reduction sufficiently are often too optimistic about 25 
the promise of completeness, hoping to provide students with something like a full account of a 26 
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field. These considerations of the formation of understanding present an interesting contrast to 1 
the example of the balance bike and suggest an important place for the process of 2 
generalization. For generalization to take place, educators must draw attention to particular 3 
events, episodes, or examples, indicating that generalization is both a kind of reduction and a 4 
kind of expansion. As with a telescope or microscope, by elimination and reduction, we can see 5 
that much more. 6 
I have argued that pedagogical reduction in some form is widely practiced but is 7 
insufficiently theorized. In essence, the problem with a lack of theory here is a tendency to let 8 
prejudice or commonsense practices lead the process of pedagogical reduction. In addition, this 9 
process is relatively untheorized within Anglo-American educational theory because of a 10 
tendency to move too quickly to the critique of ideology.13 By this, I mean that analysis of the 11 
selections and simplifications of pedagogical reduction are equated with the sociopolitical 12 
questions of whose interests govern those selections and simplifications,14 sometimes 13 
overlooking important aspects of what exactly such selections and simplifications involve.15 After 14 
we have developed a fuller conception of pedagogical reduction, we will turn to these critical 15 
concerns by discussing progressive and critical pedagogy. But even those theorists who would 16 
recognize the role of the educator might not immediately draw upon the term I am advocating. 17 
Klaus Mollenhauer, for instance, makes a great deal of the idea that education is characterized 18 
by a process of presentation and representation, emphasizing the interpretive dimension of 19 
education and the vital role that the educator plays. However, Mollenhauer’s emphasis is on the 20 
pedagogical relation rather than the pedagogical reduction (a term he does not use).16 But it is 21 
clear that the pedagogical relation entails some kind of authority to determine “what appears to 22 
us to be tolerable or worth pointing out to children.”17 Determining what is (or is not) important or 23 
worthwhile is part of showing the world since every pedagogical showing entails judgment. 24 
Mollenhauer emphasizes the role of the educator as the one who provides an interpretive re-25 
presentation, without referring to the concept of pedagogical reduction.  26 
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Despite the fact that the term does not appear in Mollenhauer’s text, the German 1 
Didaktik tradition has developed a theoretical literature around a term very similar to 2 
pedagogical reduction — didaktishe Reduktion18 — which suggests there is value in bringing 3 
this tradition into further dialogue with the Anglo-American context. Consider, for instance, the 4 
following: 5 
In discussion about the curriculum, the main problem is choosing and justifying the 6 
content. Everyone expects the teacher to “simplify” and “elementarise.” In what follows I 7 
consider simplification as the process of making accessible. I do not touch upon 8 
simplification in the sense of pruning or “stepping down to a lower level.”19 9 
Here, Arnold Kirsch introduces a discussion of simplification within the context of math 10 
instruction. This writing, first published in 1976, reflects the more developed consideration of 11 
pedagogical representation and reduction that exists in the German Didaktik tradition. In 12 
developing this argument, I hope to encourage further dialogue between that tradition and my 13 
own (education studies within the Anglo-American context).20 14 
There are other reasons to consider using the term pedagogical reduction, as well. In the 15 
introduction, I referred to the idea of pedagogical reduction as a constraint that enables. 16 
Gallagher argues that hermeneutic constraints “both limit and enable the processes of 17 
interpretation and education” through binding us to the traditions that provide the interpretive 18 
context for our being-in-the-world.21 If a tradition or education constrains how we understand or 19 
interact with the world, then it seems reasonable to call that constraint a kind of reduction. 20 
Reductionism, and generalization, might even be said to be intrinsic to understanding and 21 
interpretation as such.22 In addition to this, I have already attempted to explain the concept of 22 
the pedagogical reduction by referring to the role educators play in distilling the complexity of 23 
the world primarily through the concepts of simplification and selection. The concepts of 24 
simplification and selection seem to me prima facie aspects of subtraction and, therefore, of 25 
reduction. Furthermore, ideas around pedagogical knowledge and the noncoincidence of 26 
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educators’ understanding and their re-presentation provides further insight concerning what is 1 
meant by simplification: the educator does not say everything he or she might about a particular 2 
subject, just as the balance bike does not provide access to all of the practices that  cycling 3 
comprises. However, a serious objection might be that the idea of a subtraction, or 4 
(re)presentation of only a selection of the educator’s understanding, encourages a reified 5 
concept of education, that is, of being content that can be added, subtracted, transferred, and 6 
so on. We might run into problems if we suppose that there is a stable body of knowledge from 7 
which selections and simplifications are made. But the concept of pedagogical reduction 8 
describes a process and product in terms that do not rely on a reified body of stable knowledge. 9 
Translation and interpretation are essential ingredients in this re-presentation of the world, and 10 
these terms might better capture the idea of reduction in some contexts. However, the balance 11 
bike example is helpful in showing that the pedagogical reduction can be embodied; the bike is 12 
the result of an intentional concern to affect a student’s relation to some subject matter (in this 13 
case, learning to ride a bike), even where that subject matter is not clear cut or stable. This is 14 
why we might also refer to reduction as a kind of showing. From the perspective of 15 
hermeneutics, the relation (between the student and the ability to ride a bike) already exists, 16 
albeit as something of an absence. The reduction is offered as a way to assist a change in that 17 
relation. Such a change is not simply a transferal of skill from educator to student, but entails a 18 
change in the relation between the student and the subject matter of knowing how to ride.  19 
The processes of simplification and selection entail a further pedagogical operation that I 20 
have only briefly touched on so far —  namely generalization. Consider, for a moment, the 21 
context of perception, whereby the representation of sensory data in constructing experience 22 
describes the process of seeing objects as objects, a process that is both reductive and 23 
generalizing. One might even say that in perception the phenomenological reduction constitutes 24 
the generalization, and here the connections with the role of schema within the processes of 25 
education are suggestive. According to Jean Piaget’s conception, schemata, — structures of 26 
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thought into which new experiences are assimilated, and which must, at the same time, 1 
accommodate themselves to the new — are forms of constructing experience that are 2 
educational.23 It is in this context that the association of reduction with generalization, from 3 
diverse classroom experiences (examples, experiments, episodes) to a general principle, can 4 
be developed. This has particular significance for education since it is fundamentally concerned 5 
with a reduction from the many experiences of the world that are possible to understanding 6 
general principles and norms that lie “behind” and structure those experiences. In addition, 7 
processes of generalization are closely aligned with processes of induction that are also worth 8 
developing. 9 
In The Textbook and the Lecture Norm Friesen describes the development of the 10 
pedagogical process of induction by looking at the evolution of the textbook. Friesen draws 11 
attention to how the modern textbook often begins a topic by asking readers to reflect on their 12 
own experiences of some particular issue, going on to show how those experiences are 13 
addressed in the general categories presented by the matter of the textbook.24 For Friesen, this 14 
approach reflects the inductive method that begins by way of a reduction: the particular 15 
experiences of the learner are the point of entry from which more general understanding can be 16 
induced. Friesen shows this inductive method to be reflective of Johann Pestalozzi’s theory of 17 
education in which the student moves from particular sense impressions to various levels of 18 
abstraction.25 As I will discuss in the next section, scientific and mathematical education 19 
illustrate well how induction works not through an encounter with the principles of science or 20 
math directly, but through an experience of the particular reductions of science and math in the 21 
figures, forms, and experiments that give indications of the principles that stand “behind” them. 22 
Experience and understanding appear, then, to be in tension with one another since 23 
understanding generalizes and therefore reduces from experience. 24 
The reasons for proposing the term pedagogical reduction can be summarized as 25 
follows: the term provides a clear understanding of the processes and results of simplification, 26 
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selection, and generalization, and helps us to direct more conscious attention to the criteria 1 
determining pedagogical reductions. I will briefly illustrate these issues in particular curricula 2 
domains — history education, science education, and philosophy education — so that the 3 
movement (or dialectic) between particular experiences and the principles or universals for 4 
which those experiences stand can be observed. 5 
Pedagogical Reduction in Practice 6 
Arguing for the elevated position of poetry, Aristotle said that history concerns only the 7 
particular while poetry concerns the universal.26 In reference to history qua history, this 8 
argument might be convincing, but when examining distinctly pedagogical questions, history 9 
looks very different. Drawing again on the point that education directs the student to what the 10 
educator thinks is important or appropriate at any given stage, and applying this observation to 11 
the context of teaching history, the educator’s concern is less the particulars than the principles 12 
that those particulars point to. Resisting the temptation of completeness, students are not 13 
expected to learn every historical event or detail, and so part of a pedagogical reduction will be 14 
the choices educators make when introducing students to exemplary historical moments. Here I 15 
emphasize that the details express something significant that the educator wishes the students 16 
to learn. The details of the particular event may well be less important than the more general, 17 
universal themes. For instance, a class about the suffragettes, about civil rights, or about British 18 
rule in India all might be used to illustrate the fragility and contingency of our notions of 19 
democracy and justice; alternatively, they might be used to reinforce certain nationalist 20 
narratives and ideologies that educational authorities take to be essential. In such cases, 21 
historical detail is often a vehicle for making broader points. The details may add a certain color, 22 
texture, or interest, and so may have important mnemonic significance, but the real lesson of 23 
the class is general. An important task of the educator is to select the most exemplary form of 24 
the principle at stake. Curricula selections are chosen on the basis that they have significant 25 
power of exemplarity.  26 
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A similar structure can be detected in science education. Students are led to an 1 
understanding of scientific principles by way of pedagogical reductions. Of course, students 2 
enter “science” through subject and topic domains, and through structured curricula with 3 
particular elements that provide a view of the field. Here, principles or natural laws are illustrated 4 
through certain experiments or pieces of data. Principles of electricity, for instance, are 5 
demonstrated through particular objects or experiments (for instance, using lemons, wire, and a 6 
lightbulb to show the process of electrolysis), or the principles of evolution are illustrated through 7 
the diverse shapes of the beaks of finches on different islands.  8 
In philosophy, we can see that the principles of human knowing and decision making are 9 
often illustrated by way of particular events, episodes, and examples: experiments in logic, for 10 
example. The educator engages in pedagogical reduction by selecting, say, the famous trolley-11 
car scenarios in ethics. These scenarios illustrate the ways in which decisions are often rooted 12 
in utilitarian or rights-based reasoning. Again, the educator’s concern is to illustrate and explore 13 
the forms and conditions of reasoning more than the particulars of the trolley-car scenarios 14 
themselves. 15 
I have been arguing that the reduction of the particulars to the principles behind them 16 
can be seen not only as reduction, but also as generative, as a kind of expansion, since the 17 
principles offer a wide application and allow students to “see” further. Grasping a general 18 
principle expands the perceptual schema: an understanding of the principles of evolution, for 19 
instance, allows us both to notice the structure and detail of the world, and to observe with finer 20 
attention since more detailed phenomena “fit in” rational schema; an understanding of the 21 
principles of decision making better equips us to perceive the ways in which human agency is 22 
constituted and influenced. This explains not only that perception reduces to understanding, but 23 
also indicates the educational formation of perceptual schema through intentional pedagogical 24 
activities (learning to see).  25 
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In history, science, philosophy, and (arguably) across the entire school curriculum, the 1 
educator’s prime concern is to engage students with generative principles. This appears to be a 2 
familiar process of induction, but it raises pedagogical questions. What is the educator 3 
introducing the student to? What is made visible in the pedagogical act of drawing attention? Is 4 
it the particular examples and experiments, or general principles or forms? The reduction seems 5 
to be a process of induction: the particulars of the case are reduced to a general principle. The 6 
educator will hope that the reduction is sufficiently meaningful to the student, and that it has also 7 
the character of an expansion. One might object that this kind of induction or expansion is not 8 
helpfully identified with the idea of reduction. It is true that the educator presents a reduction of 9 
the world in order to bring about something like an expansion. But a generalization can be 10 
usefully seen as intrinsically reductive, since we no longer look at the individual cases on their 11 
individual merit, but as part of a general narrative. The ascent of the mind might not, in itself, be 12 
best described as reduction, but that ascent is something of a mystery within education, since 13 
its presence and effect are matters of speculation: we don’t really know what takes place in the 14 
event of understanding, but I think we can be confident that this event depends upon acts of 15 
reduction. 16 
The efforts to define the structures of selection, simplification, and generalization in 17 
terms of the pedagogical reduction suggest a great deal more that could be said about the 18 
practices of pedagogical reduction. Here, I can only briefly touch on one important practical 19 
question, namely the practical wisdom (phronesis) that educational practitioners develop 20 
through experience and reflection on experience. In his account of pedagogical tact, John 21 
Herbart described the importance of practical wisdom, noting that such wisdom is vital in 22 
deciding when and how to use pedagogical representations and reductions.27 Because of the 23 
ambivalent nature of the textbook reduction (that it both reveals and conceals), it is essential 24 
that educators pay attention to the students’ relation to the reduction in order to determine when 25 
to give and to take that particular pedagogical form. The Heidelberg Catechism, as noted 26 
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previously, is an important pedagogical tool; still, that it cannot serve as a substitute for the 1 
gospel is equally true. Good teaching, therefore, entails the appropriate use of the pedagogical 2 
reduction at the right moment. 3 
It has been argued that it was only around the age of the European Enlightenment, as 4 
schooling became more formalized and universal, that the question of how the complex world 5 
ought to be pedagogically represented became urgent. Is this a consequence of the 6 
development of science and later industrialization? Is this to do with the breakdown of the 7 
unified theological order of Christian cosmology (the Aristotelian–Ptolemaic cosmology undone 8 
by the Copernican revolution)? How is this related to the emergence of childhood as a distinct 9 
phase of life whose innocence is to be protected, and for whom the world in miniature is made 10 
present in manifold ways (for example, through toys)? To what extent is mass state-sponsored 11 
education the real driver of the question of how to represent the world to the young? Arguably, 12 
all of these questions play a role, but I refer again to Mollenhauer at this point since he touches 13 
on many of these questions when developing an important point: that self-conscious 14 
pedagogical representation was not widespread until around the mid-seventeenth century. 15 
The Pedagogical Reduction in Comenius 16 
Mollenhauer has argued that a new pedagogical age dawned with Johan Comenius’s 17 
publication of Orbis Sensualium Pictus, often regarded as the first textbook for children. At this 18 
point, according to Mollenhauer, we first see children not just present to the world, but having it 19 
re-presented to them. In the transition from presentation to representation, Mollenhauer says, 20 
we see the “social construction of an educational reality” for which “specialized institutions are 21 
needed: schools (no longer for a tiny minority: now children from the urban middle class).”28 22 
Although Mollenhauer does not refer explicitly to the concept of the pedagogical reduction, he 23 
does refer to the associated idea that schools became spaces for “pedagogical rehearsal”:29 24 
educational spaces are not “real world” spaces since they are set apart precisely in order to 25 
offer students the opportunity to rehearse complex actions, knowledges, and attitudes before 26 
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they are performed for “real.” These processes of, and spaces for, representation, reduction, 1 
and rehearsal are vital to understanding the appropriate scope of pedagogical reductions. 2 
Mollenhauer’s reference to Comenius is significant for my argument since Orbis Sensualium 3 
Pictus exemplifies all the features of the pedagogical reduction: selection, simplification, and 4 
generalization. Indeed, Mollenhauer frames his discussion of Comenius around the key 5 
questions that have occupied us here: “Of all the things there are to learn, which ones are truly 6 
important[?]” (selection) and “How can these be conveyed with the needed clarity[?]” 7 
(simplification).30  8 
First published in 1658 in Latin-German, and then, only one year later, published in 9 
Latin-English, Orbis Sensualium Pictus — normally translated as The Visible World in Pictures 10 
— is one of the first pedagogical works for children, and it is a curious text when it comes to the 11 
question of representation. The text concerns, as the title page has it, that which is obvious to 12 
the senses, including divine things. If we are to consider Orbis as a generative pedagogical 13 
reduction, providing a representation of the world, we must ask what is the organizing structure 14 
of this generative representation? Unsurprisingly, the structure of the book reflects the 15 
organization of the late medieval/early modern cosmos. Following an exhortation to wisdom,31 16 
the text addresses the reader to very concrete and visible matters. Beginning with what might 17 
be read as an early version of “Old Macdonald Had a Farm,” drawings of different animals are 18 
presented along with their names and characteristic animal sounds. This introduction to the 19 
sounds is linked to the alphabet by way of the naming of familiar animals (the text explicitly 20 
references Adam’s naming of the animals in the book of Genesis32). This is immediately 21 
followed by an analysis of God in himself (as Blessed, everlasting, spiritual, and so on). The text 22 
moves on to creation (heaven and earth), followed by the elements (fire, air, water, vapor, 23 
earth), and through a list of inanimate and animate objects, to human beings, then to things 24 
arising through the interaction with things, onto objects of higher culture and learning, virtues, 25 
and social ideas, culminating in religion. Organized along the lines of the great chain of being 26 
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and the order of creation in Genesis, everything here has its place in the cosmic hierarchy, while 1 
also being systematically presented for pedagogical purposes.33 This systematic representation 2 
of the world can be regarded as complete, offering the child access to both the symbolic order 3 
of literacy, as well as the universals that encompass everything. Noting that the text is organized 4 
both ontologically and pedagogically is itself an acknowledgment that for Comenius ontology is 5 
intrinsically pedagogical since, from the perspective of late medieval to early modern 6 
philosophy, Divine providence ensures that the organization of things is toward being known 7 
(and being learned). The intention of Orbis is primarily to say something true about the world, 8 
which indeed is explicitly stated as the first principle of the teaching of the text itself.34 In order 9 
for the entire cosmos to be reduced to a textbook, Orbis must be capable of representing the 10 
order of things. We may struggle to see everything enfolded into the modern textbook, but, at 11 
least for Comenius, Orbis is there to mediate a universal order and to bring essences into view. 12 
In other words, the pages of the book refer to what is often taken to be invisible: universals that 13 
particular objects provide instantiations of.  14 
It is clear that Comenius carefully considered the key pedagogical questions (what 15 
should be presented and how), reflecting directly our concerns of selection, simplification, and 16 
generalization. But he lived at a time when the order of the world was still thinkable, even if 17 
fractured by the nascent rise of science and modernity. Today, it seems that we no longer 18 
assume this order to underpin general education, and so the selections and simplifications are 19 
organized by other principles — such as utility, preference, interest, marketability, or power — 20 
raising questions that later came to define the concerns of critical pedagogy. My point here is 21 
that the organizing principles for determining reduction and re-presentation can be radically 22 
variant, but, despite the contrast, the fundamental structure of reduction for pedagogy pertains 23 
to both pre- and postmodern. The pedagogical reduction of Comenius’s text offers us a 24 
perspective of the whole by way of the parts arranged in a particular order, vividly illustrating the 25 
principles that can be observed in subsequent representations in the history of the textbook. For 26 
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Mollenhauer, the significance of Orbis is partly its role in the history of the formation of 1 
pedagogical representations of the world, and so it can be seen as exemplary of a pedagogical 2 
reduction as defined here. 3 
Comenius can be said to be among the first to employ reduction in a systematic and 4 
explicit fashion, but, as has been seen, the concept has been developed by others, most 5 
notably perhaps by the best-known American philosopher of education, John Dewey. In 6 
Democracy and Education, Dewey says: 7 
the inequality of achievement between the mature and the immature not only 8 
necessitates teaching the young, but the necessity of this teaching gives an immense 9 
stimulus to reducing experience to that order and form which will render it most easily 10 
communicable and hence most usable.35  11 
And in reference to school: 12 
The first office of the social organ we call the school is to provide a simplified 13 
environment. It selects the features which are fairly fundamental and capable of being 14 
responded to by the young. Then it establishes a progressive order, using the factors 15 
first acquired as means of gaining insight into what is more complicated.36  16 
We need to keep in mind that the critiques from the perspective of “progressive education,” such 17 
as they are, should be moderated by examining what Dewey, the oft-proclaimed father of 18 
progressive education in America, and others labeled “progressive” might have to say. What 19 
follows is not a direct response to issues with the “pedagogical reduction,” but an examination of 20 
certain orthodoxies within progressive and critical pedagogies and how they are in tension with 21 
this account of pedagogical reduction. 22 
Critical Concerns 23 
It is not possible here to give a full treatment of the various critical positions across 24 
progressive and critical pedagogies, and so in what follows I rely on generalizations 25 
(pedagogical reductions, if you will) that could be disputed by offering counterexamples. The 26 
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argument is, therefore, little more than suggestive of some general problems concerning how 1 
progressive and critical pedagogies sometimes conceive the interpretive necessities of 2 
curriculum selection, simplification, and generalization. Moreover, much that will be considered 3 
here has already been anticipated, so the task now is to connect, highlight, and respond to 4 
those issues that reduction is likely to raise. 5 
The practical issues concerning the appropriate use — that is, the “give and take” — of 6 
pedagogical reductions, and the faculty of pedagogical tact in making judgments about them, 7 
raise again the fundamentally interpretive nature of educational re-presentation. Education is 8 
intrinsically interpretive, or hermeneutical, in nature since every form of teaching and learning 9 
entails unavoidable interpretation. In other words, there is no standing outside of the 10 
hermeneutical circle, either for the teacher or the student who are both placed, or who find 11 
themselves, within horizons of understanding. In turn, within education there is no standing 12 
outside the pedagogical representation (and reduction) of the world. This point is essential when 13 
examining critical theories of education since it draws attention to the fact that critical reflection 14 
itself is always bound by hermeneutical constraints, acknowledging that there is no place 15 
outside of the structures of authority and power. This should lead us to consider how authority 16 
and power is properly located and exercised, rather than whether we can be fully emancipated. 17 
Although critical thinking “prescribes suspicion rather than trust,”37 as Gallagher succinctly puts 18 
it, the trust I would advocate is not trust in any particular interpretation or reduction, but in the 19 
structural need for interpretive reduction as such.38 Of course, critique still plays a role in 20 
determining the particular nature and scope of pedagogical reduction. However, Jürgen 21 
Habermas’s critical hermeneutics has been influential among critical theorists of education, 22 
some of whom ultimately seek forms of radical emancipation from power and authority within 23 
education.39 For the purposes of this argument, the general result is that progressive educators 24 
and critical pedagogues (at least in certain forms) do not acknowledge the general structure of 25 
education as necessitating reduction. In an age in which educational authenticity is generally 26 
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espoused, any notion of reduction in education is regarded with suspicion. The kinds of 1 
selection and simplification discussed in this article entail significant normative considerations: 2 
what is explicitly and implicitly valued by the selection process, and whose interests are thereby 3 
served? Such normative questions are addressed by critical pedagogues who wish to denounce 4 
implicit value structures as ideological. Before coming to examine that critique in more detail, I 5 
want first to consider progressive education by looking at the concept of authenticity.  6 
Despite the views of Dewey already expressed, it is not uncommon among progressive 7 
educators to claim that education should strive for authentic experience of the world and that the 8 
educational space should be, as far as possible, continuous with, or indistinguishable from, a 9 
putative real world. In his book Shop Class as Soulcraft, Matthew Crawford begins with a 10 
quotation from Doug Stowe that captures something of this tension: “In schools, we create 11 
artificial learning environments for our children that they know to be contrived and undeserving 12 
of their full attention and engagement.… [T]he world remains abstract, and distant, and the 13 
passions for learning will not be engaged.”40 The idea that schools are artificial, inauthentic 14 
places that present abstract ideas disengaged from the world has become a common critique 15 
within progressive education. Such complaints must be taken seriously, though not uncritically. 16 
They aspire to make education “real world” rather than abstract or rehearsed, but these critical 17 
interruptions tend to throw out the baby with the bathwater, since the learning environment also 18 
works precisely through contrivance and abstraction. Contrary to this desire for authenticity, I 19 
suggest that if reduction leads to inauthenticity, then education could be taken as intrinsically 20 
“inauthentic.” It is precisely because the original concept of schooling suggested a space and 21 
time in which the assumptions and practices of the supposed “real world” can be interrupted that 22 
recent educational theory has begun to (re)make a coherent defense of school, as in the Greek 23 
concept scholè: free time, rest, delay, study, discussion.41 Ilmi Willbergh has provided an 24 
analysis of the appropriate deployment of authenticity in education that further makes the point: 25 
“it may be claimed from the Bildung perspective that instruction should be inauthentic to make 26 
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possible an authentic meeting between student and content…. [T]he object is taken out of its 1 
ordinary context and placed into a new institutionalised context.”42 Nevertheless, and to 2 
recognize the legitimate concerns of progressive education, the foremost criterion for 3 
determining the worth of these efforts to interrupt should, in the words of Wolfgang Klafki, be 4 
“whether the activities can come alive and be effective outside the school’s walls.”43 But this 5 
concern may be addressed more effectively by Willbergh’s authentic meeting between student 6 
and content than by some putative authentic encounter with the world. And, of course, the 7 
concept of authentic encounter is a matter of judgment that requires some kind of educational 8 
intervention. It is necessary that someone (the educator) considers whether the lesson will 9 
indeed be of significance for the student’s future, since this is difficult to do for oneself,44 a point 10 
that also undermines some stronger conceptions of child-centered education. Throughout this 11 
article, I have implied that a legitimate dimension of the educator’s authority lies in the intention 12 
to present pedagogical reductions, but how far is this a legitimate exercise of educational 13 
authority? This question links the progressive critique to that of critical pedagogy. 14 
The authority of the educator to define what and how to show the world could be a 15 
criterion for making the controversial distinction between higher and lower cultural forms, 16 
through the curation of a canon; a perspective focused not so much on, as Matthew Arnold’s oft-17 
quoted phrase has it, “the best that has been thought and said,”45 but instead on exemplary 18 
episodes in history and culture. Here “best” is directed to a pedagogical rather than to an 19 
absolute/cultural evaluation, thereby acknowledging the educator’s necessary role in 20 
pedagogical reduction. Much as progressive educators might seek to disavow educational 21 
authority in this way, or critical pedagogues might draw attention to the hegemonic nature of this 22 
selection process or of evaluative ascriptions of “high art,” this view of pedagogical reduction 23 
seems both irresponsible and impossible to entirely disavow, and, indeed, something that the 24 
student hopes for, if not quite demands, from the teacher. From this point of view, reduction is 25 
intended to make some aspect of the world available to the student, despite the fact that 26 
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reduction and representation are sometimes associated not with revealing the world, but with 1 
concealing it. This brings us to consider the concerns of critical pedagogy. 2 
Critical pedagogy has a direct concern with demystifying the sociopolitical interests and 3 
hegemonies that govern the pedagogical reduction. Those hegemonies determine the manner 4 
in which curricula are formed, governing the selections and simplification on the basis of criteria 5 
that, so the argument runs, are inherently ideological. Such criticisms can be found in the work 6 
of a range of theorists such as Paulo Freire, Ira Shor, bell hooks, Michael Apple, and Henry 7 
Giroux, among others, and they coalesce around a concern to bring about some kind of critical 8 
awareness of the hegemonic nature of education as currently practiced. Concerning reduction, 9 
they argue that the authorities who select are not representative since they are constituted by a 10 
narrow social grouping and thus yield selections that reflect narrow interests. Giroux, for 11 
instance, says that “[w]hile all of the learning skills are important, their limitations as a whole lie 12 
in what is excluded, and it is with respect to what is missing that the ideology of such an 13 
approach is revealed.”46 These concerns around selective exclusion are related to wider issues 14 
of the reproduction of power, since the selections that define “culture” reproduce ideology.47 I 15 
am not denying the importance of acknowledging where a given educational canon is 16 
disproportionately constituted by figures from certain groups in society, as well as the tendency 17 
to reproduction. Recognizing these critical issues does not, however, absolve the need for 18 
reduction as such. It is perhaps easier to rail against those authorities governing pedagogical 19 
reductions in general than to offer a rationale for different choices concerning a necessary 20 
reduction. It is too easy to interpret critical pedagogy as lifting the veil, or revealing the truth, 21 
without recognizing the principle of hermeneutics that my account of reduction builds upon — 22 
namely, that revelation of the world always entails a different reduction; or, as Martin Heidegger 23 
put it, that every revealing is also a concealing.48 This is to recognize our hermeneutic condition: 24 
that interpretation, reduction, and education belong together. There is a danger that critical 25 
pedagogy is understood to be doing away with the pedagogical reduction itself, thereby failing to 26 
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recognize both the generative capacity of reduction and the hermeneutic dimensions of critical 1 
pedagogy. In fact, critical pedagogy can (and often does) work not to disavow educational 2 
authority, but to reinterpret it to make it more representative of the public that it embodies,49 and 3 
so should not be seen as critical of reduction as such. Indeed, the general view of critical 4 
pedagogy — that education is inherently political — attests to the need for a reduction, though 5 
that politicization must be seen in its complexity, as constituting the pedagogical responsibility, 6 
not contaminating it.  7 
Anglo-American educational theory has developed a wide range of analytical resources 8 
to use in critically interrogating the structures and practices of education. What requires more 9 
analysis is the systematic consideration of educational relations and structures themselves, a 10 
situation that this article attempts to begin to redress. 11 
Conclusion 12 
The need for a theory of pedagogical reduction is justified on the basis that an absence 13 
of theory will lead to practices that are haphazard and prejudiced. Critical pedagogy can surely 14 
contribute to the development of such a theory, but only in response to a better articulated 15 
description of reduction first. Otherwise, educational theory can seem to face a false dilemma: 16 
either accept the need for a contrived educational experience that is disconnected from the 17 
actual experiences and concerns of life, or react against this flattened educational aspiration by 18 
seeking something authentic and progressive that meaninglessly conflates education and life. 19 
Such an opposition characterizes some of the cruder representations of traditional/conservative 20 
versus progressive/critical education, and it is not helpful for understanding the proper place of 21 
pedagogical reduction. A proper understanding of the educational need for interpretation and 22 
reduction provides a more informed space for understanding the shared concerns of the 23 
traditional and conservative, as well as the progressive and critical, the shared concerns of how 24 
to represent the complex world to the young.  25 
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